INTRODUCTION
According to Samuel Huntington, the "Third Wave of democratization in the modern world began, implausibly and unwittingly, at twenty-five minutes after mid-night, April 25, 1974 , in Lisbon, Portugal, when a radio station played the song "Grandola Vila Morena" (Huntington, 1991) . Since then, this powerful wave swept many other countries all over the world. As a result, the number of democratic countries around the world jumped from 44 in 1974 to 65 in 1990 (Freedom House 2013c . It was oscillating between 85 and 88 at the end of the 20 th century, before stabilizing around 89 since 2005 (Freedom House, 2013c) . However, it was only at the end of the 1980s and in the early 1990s that this "Third Wave of democratization" started to shake seriously the foundation of the African dictatorial regimes. The end of the Cold War, which brought to an end the rivalry between the two superpowers and their shameless supports to dictatorial allies in Africa, helps explain why some of the African dictators were driven out of power. Additionally, the pressures from the African peoples themselves and the new conditionality imposed by the international donors (which included democratization, respect of human rights, rule of law, etc.), constrained the most reluctantly of them to embrace some forms of democracy. Consequently, the number of democratic regimes on the continent slowly moved from two in 1989 E-mail: ratsimbaharisona@benedict.edu Authors agree that this article remain permanently open access under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License 4.0 International License to nine in 1996, before reaching the plateau of11 in 2003. (Freedom House, 2013a) . Nevertheless, the coming of the "Third Wave of democratization" to Africa coincided also with the dramatic increase of armed conflicts on the continent. Thus, according to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and the International Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), the number of armed conflicts in Africa rose from 12 in 1989 to 17 in 1991, which means that one out of three African countries was involved in some type armed conflicts (from minor conflicts to full scale civil wars) by the early 1990s (Themnér and Wallensteen, 2013) . It was only in 2005 that the number of armed conflicts went down to seven, after oscillating between 10 and 17 since the end of the Cold War. It is also worth noting that the great majority of the post-Cold War armed conflicts in Africa and around the world were intrastate conflicts (including the most deadly civil wars in Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo).
Given this coincidence between the "Third Wave of democratization" and the increase of armed conflicts, many scholars and simple observers were quick to establish a causal relationship between the two phenomena. Mansfield and Snyder were among the first to claim that while democratic countries would be generally peaceful (following the so-called "democratic peace theory"), the transition to democracy (or democratization) could be dangerous and could lead to bloody interstate and intrastate armed conflicts (Mansfield and Snyder 1995; Mansfield and Snyder 2002; Mansfield and Snyder 2005; Snyder, 2000) . Since then, some scholars assumed that there was a consensus about the danger of democratization, while others argued that such consensus did not exist (Daxecker 2007; Hegre and Sambanis 2006) .
LITERATURE REVIEW
Concerning the causes of armed conflicts in general (either interstate or intrastate), scholars are divided not only between those who use quantitative methods based on large number of cases, and those who use qualitative methods based on small number of cases; but also between those who emphasize the feasibility (or opportunity) factors of armed conflicts, and those who underscore the motivations (or grievances) factors. In recent years, the field of research on armed conflicts has been dominated by scholars who used quantitative methods and emphasized the feasibility factors. Among these scholars, Paul Collier and his associates, including Anke Hoeffler and Nicolas Sambanis, produced a large body of literature on the feasibility of civil war, and particularly on the so-called "greed theory." (Collier and Hoeffler 2000; Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Collier et al. 2008; Collier and Sambanis, 2002; Collier and Sambanis (eds) 2005) . According to this theory, opportunities for primary commodity predation (looting or smuggling) by rebel groups in any given country would cause a civil war Ratsimbaharison 405
(or rebellion against the incumbent government) in that country (Collier and Hoeffler 2000; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004) . Different scholars have been critical of the methods used by Paul Collier and his associates, along with the results they obtained on the feasibility aspects of armed conflicts (Boas and Dunn 2007; Fearon 2005; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Ratsimbaharison H 2011) . Particularly, in revisiting the greed theory, the author of this study reached the following conclusion: "Although the greed theory may be based on some statistical evidence, it does not provide a good explanation as to why many civil wars have occurred in Africa in the post-Cold War era. Moreover, it could not possibly help resolve the ongoing civil wars." (Ratsimbaharison, 2011) .
Beyond greed and grievances, poverty and ethnicity (which may also include ethnic nationalism or ethnic rivalry) have been identified by many scholars as major factors or determinants of armed conflicts. (Baten and Mumme (n.d.) ; Brainard and Chollet, 2007; Draman, 2003; Rice et al., 2006) . However, there is no agreement on how or under what conditions exactly these factors could lead to conflicts. For instance, Rasheed Draman argues that: "Poverty leads to conflict in direct and indirect ways. The direct ways include the psychological theories of frustration-aggression and relative deprivation; and the indirect factors include economic arguments that demonstrate that conflicts in Africa and most of the developing world are fuelled by greed rather than grievance" (Draman, 2003 (Fearon and Laitin, 2003) .
In general, democratization does not appear in the literature as a major cause of armed conflicts in Africa or elsewhere. However, following the works of Mansfield and Snyder, mentioned earlier (Mansfield and Snyder, 1995; Mansfield and Snyder, 2002; Mansfield and Snyder 2005; Snyder 2000) , many other scholars also find that democratization is to blame for some specific armed conflicts. Nevertheless, we have to recognize once again that there was no consensus on how or under what conditions exactly democratization could lead to armed conflicts. Among the conditions that would make democratization conducive to armed conflicts, some scholars point to the fact that the type of democratization, either complete or incomplete with reversals, could play an important role (Daxecker, 2007; Mansfield and Snyder, 2002 (Daxecker, 2007) .
Furthermore, others scholars argue that democratization per se may not be the problem, but democratization in combination with other factors or conditions, such as elections, ethnic nationalism, nationalist rhetoric, political uncertainty, etc (Cederman et al., 2013; Mansfield and Snyder, 2005; Savun and Tirone, 2011 (Cederman et al., 2013) .
In sum, the review of literature reveals that there is no consensus, neither on the causes of armed conflicts in general, nor on the connection between democratization and armed conflicts in particular.
Research questions
Given this ambiguous connection between democratization and armed conflicts in post-Cold War Africa, the purpose of this study is to address specifically the following questions: (Freedom House, 2013b; Freedom House, 2013d; Themnér and Wallensteen, 2013) .
1 These two datasets have been merged and recoded to capture the instances of political transitions (either to democracy or to autocracy) and armed conflicts based on countryyear observations in the post-Cold War Africa.
In line with Freedom House"s methodology, democratization which is also referred to as "transition to democracy," is simply defined in this study as a "process leading toward a more democratic regime." It is measured in terms of improvement of citizens" political rights and civil liberties, and classified into two types: 2 1) A full democratization, when the status of the country moves, following Freedom House"s terminology, from the status of "Not Free" (or autocratic) to "Free" (or liberal democracy), or from "Partly Free" (or electoral democracy) to "Free" (or liberal democracy). 2) A partial democratization, when there are improvements of the citizens" political rights and civil liberties without changing the status of the country to "Free" (or liberal democracy). In other words, in a partial democratization, the status of the country remains either "Not Free" or "Partly Free."
In connection with the data provided by UCDP/PRIO, which is also referred to as "UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset," armed conflict is defined as "a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths." 3 UCDP/PRIO"s classification between minor conflicts (resulting in 25 to 999 battle-related deaths in a given year) and wars (resulting in at least 1,000 battle-related deaths in a given year) will not be taken into consideration in this study, since we are only interested in the occurrences of any type of armed conflict.
Concerning the qualitative data, we collected the narratives on selected cases of democratization followed by armed conflict. In the identification of the cases selected in this study, we took the following steps: 1) First, all instances of democratization followed by armed conflicts within five years have been automatically identified. 4 This procedure generated a list of 76 instances that have occurred in 25 countries. 2) Next, in order to be consistent with one of the most important rules of causation in social science, with stipulates that "a causal relationship exists [if, and only if,] the cause precedes the effect in time" (Babbie, 2007) . All instances of democratization that have been preceded by any type of armed conflict or have occurred in the context of ongoing armed conflicts have been dropped. This procedure generated a final list of four countries, which are included in the comparative case study. These countries are: Algeria, Congo Republic, Guinea-Bissau and Côte d"Ivoire.
In order to address the question of how the process of democratization could lead to armed conflicts, we undertook a comparative analysis of the above four cases, referring consistently to the narratives provided by UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, (Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP, 2013) and applying the method of "structured, focused comparison," championed by Alexander George and Andrew Bennett (George and Bennett 2005) . It is worth noting that the application of this research method requires some consistency regarding the qualitative data (or narratives) we are comparing. This is why we consistently refer to the qualitative data provided by UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia which is one of the most rigorous and reliable research institutes in the identification and analyses of armed conflicts around the world. Indeed, according to its own website, "The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) has recorded ongoing violent conflicts since the 1970s. The data provided is one of the most accurate and wellused data-sources on global armed conflicts and its definition of armed conflict is becoming a standard in how conflicts are systematically defined and studied."
In addition to the method of "structured, focused comparison," the techniques of conflict analysis, suggested by Paul Wehr (Wehr, 1998) and Peter Harris and his associates, (Harris and Reilly, 1998) were also used in the comparative analysis. From these techniques, we determine that the most appropriate way to analyze qualitatively an armed conflict is to focus on the following conditions or factors: context of the conflict, actors (or parties) involved in the conflict, issues (or incompatibilities) involved in the conflict, and triggers (or direct causes) of the conflict.
FINDINGS

Statistical analysis
Africa has remained largely autocratic or "Not Free" (according to Freedom House"s terminology) since the end of the Cold War. Indeed, as shown in Table 1 and Figure 1 , based on country-year observations, 72.5% of the time, there was no political transition throughout the continent. The transitions to democracy (or democratizations) occurred only 16.3% of the time, and the transitions to autocracy (or autocratizations) 11.2% of the time.
It is true that almost all African countries have initiated some types of democratization since the end of the Cold War. However, as shown in Table 2 and Figure 2 , most of the transitions to democracy have been limited in depth. Indeed, only 6.4% of them can be classified as full democratizations, and have led to the changes of country statuses, either from "Not Free" (autocracy) to "Free" (liberal democracy) or from "Partly Free" (electoral democracy or pseudo democracy) to "Free." In other words, 93.6% of the transitions to democracy, which have occurred in Africa since the end of the Cold War, were incomplete or partial, and did not result in the changes of country statuses to "Free." Consequently, as shown in Table 3 and Figure 3 , the number of "Free" countries in Africa increased slowly from two in 1989 to 11 in 2003, before declining to 9 in 2010. In the meantime, the great majority of African countries have remained either "Partly Free" or "Not Free" (respectively 43% and 29% in 2012).
Concerning the occurrences of armed conflicts, it can be argued that, contrary to the dire predictions made by some observers at the end of the Cold War (Kaplan, 1994) , most African countries have been relatively peaceful since the end of the Cold War. Indeed, as shown in Table 4 and Figure 4 , there was no armed conflict 76.2% of the time, compared to 23.8% of the time with armed conflicts.
Besides, most of the armed conflicts were concentrated in a few countries (including Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, Sierra Leona, Liberia, and Algeria), and a great number of African countries (with a total 22 countries) have never experienced any type of armed conflict since the end of the Cold War.
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With regard to the connection between political transitions and occurrence of armed conflicts, it can be argued that, for the most part, the transitions to democracy have been more peaceful than the transitions to autocracy and the lack of transition. Indeed, as shown 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Free Countries 2 3 4 8 9 8 8 9 9 9 9 8 9 9 11 11 11 11 11 11 10 9 9 9
Partly Free Countries 12 the crosstabulation in Table 5 , 66.3% of the transitions to democracy have been peaceful, compared to 57.9% of the transitions to autocracy and 65.5% of the lack of transition. Thus, even though the relationships between political transitions and occurrence of armed conflicts were not statistically significant, this crosstabulation clearly indicates that the transitions to democracy may have generated fewer armed conflicts than the transitions to autocracy and lack of transition: only 33.7% of the transitions to democracy have been followed by armed conflicts within five years, compared to 42.1% of the transitions to autocracy and 34.5% of the lack of transition. In sum, even though most African countries have initiated some types of transitions to democracy, since the end of the Cold War, these transitions have been limited in space and depth and have been for the most part peaceful.
Consequently, it can be reasonably argued that the transitions to democracy were not one of the major factors leading to the increase of armed conflicts in Post-Cold War Africa. Nevertheless, we have to recognize at the same time that some of these transitions to democracy have been actually followed by armed conflicts within five years. We address in the next section the conditions under which a democratization process can lead to an armed conflict.
Comparative analysis
As explained in the methodology section above, four clear cases of democratization followed by armed conflicts have been identified in this study. These cases are: Algeria, Congo Republic, Guinea-Bissau and Côte d"Ivoire. We apply the method of "structured, focused comparison" in this comparative analysis, and take into account the following conditions or factors: contexts of conflict, actors (or parties) involved, issues (or incompatibilities), and triggers (or direct causes).
Contexts of conflict
In analyzing the contexts of conflict of the four cases, we find in each one of them the following conditions, which have been also identified by other scholars as highly conducive to conflicts: overlapping or reinforcing social cleavages, (Goodin, 1975; Lijphart, 2012; Lijphart, 1975;  (Cederman et al., 2013; Daxecker, 2007; Mansfield and Snyder 2002) . In the case of Algeria, the religious cleavage between Islamists and secularists was reinforced by a socioeconomic cleavage between the poor and less educated majority, on the one hand, and the elite, well-educated and rich minority, on the other hand. In addition, the Islamist political parties (particularly, the Front Islamique du Salut, FIS) and armed groups (particularly, the Mouvement Islamique Armée, MIA) took advantage of these cleavages, and recruited their followers and supporters among the poor majority. The secularists, for their part, were well represented among the members of the military, the dominant political party (Front national de Liberation, FNL) and the bureaucracy. The situation became explosive in 1991, when the military staged a coup and cancelled the second round of the parliamentary elections, after the FIS won the majority of the votes in the first round. Above and beyond these cleavages, the transition to democracy was incomplete, and did not result in the institutionalization of democratic mechanisms of conflict management. Instead, it was followed by a huge reversal, which took away the political rights and civil liberties of the poor majority, and reinstated the autocratic practices of the FNL and the military (Martinez, 1998). 6 In the case of the Congo Republic, in addition to the cleavage between the different ethnic groups, there was also a regional rivalry between the North and the South. Furthermore, instead of cross-cutting these pre-existing cleavages, the political parties, created during the democratization process in the early 1990s, reinforced them. As UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia puts it:
Political parties were created by appealing to ethnic and regional loyalties and soon three main blocs could be discerned. PCT (Parti Congolais du Travail) As in the case of Algeria, the transition to democracy in Congo was also incomplete. It did not result in the granting of full political rights and civil liberties to all citizens, nor did it lead to the institutionalization of democratic mechanisms of conflict management. Consequently, when the dispute over the re-run of the legislative elections in May 1993 occurred, there was no democratic mechanism to stop the conflicts between mobilized and armed political parties.
The social cleavages in Guinea-Bissau were not as overlapping as in the two previous cases, but the gap between the elite in power and the poor majority was huge and exacerbated by the economic difficulties of the early 1990s. Consequently, when one of the military leaders, General Ansumane Mané, was dismissed by the newly elected President Viera, he was able to gather around him a massive group of angry supporters from the military and the general population. Similarly to the cases of Algeria and Congo, the transition to democracy was also incomplete in Guinea-Bissau, and did not result in the institutionalization of democratic mechanisms of conflict management. As a result, there was no democratic mechanism to settle the conflict between the two major actors, Ansumane Mané and President Viera. 8 The case of Côte d"Ivoire mirrored more those of Algeria and Congo than that of Guinea-Bissau. Indeed, in addition to the fragmentation between the 60 or so ethnic groups, there were overlapping regional, religious, and economic cleavages between the Northern people, who were largely Muslims and relatively poor, on the one hand, and the Southern people who tended to be Christians or animists, and more affluent, on the other hand. Furthermore, during the transition to democracy, there was also a tendency of some political parties to play with these different social cleavages, and to discriminate against some groups by applying the socalled criteria of "Ivoirité" (or quality of being an Ivorian) As a result, after the death in 1993 of President Houphouët-Boigny, who had the skills to manage the different types of conflicts, the clashes between these different groups along regional, religious, and economic lines were unavoidable. Besides, since the transition to democracy was also incomplete, there was no democratic mechanism to stop the armed conflicts between these groups. Thus, according to UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia:
In 1999 the first coup in the country ' Many other armed groups were created in the 1990s and joined force with MIA and FIS, after the military coup in 1992. It is also notorious that, while the Algerian government and military received support from foreign governments (including Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, France and the United States), these armed groups benefited also from the support of other Islamist organizations in other countries.
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In the case of the Congo Republic, when the multi-party system was introduced, each one of the new political parties also created their own militias. As UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia puts it:
To make credible claims to power, the three main parties mobilised youths from their respective ethnic constituency into armed militias -the Cobras (PCT), the Cocoyes (UPADS) and the Ninjas (MCDDI: Mouvement congolais pour la démocratie et le développement intégral, the Congolese Movement for Democracy and Integral Development).
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In the case of Guinea-Bissau, the leader of the opposition was able to create his own armed groups with elements from the regular army and the general population. Thus, UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia reports that: "In 1998 General Ansumane Mané formed the popularly and militarily supported Military Junta for the Consolidation of Democracy, Peace and Justice (MJCDPJ) and began an armed struggle with the aim to overthrow the Vieira government". It is also known that both the Viera government and the MJCDPJ benefited from external support. Indeed, whereas the Viera government received military support from the governments of Senegal and Guinea, the MJCDPJ was supported by the MFDC (Mouvement des forces démocratiques de Casamance; Movement of the Democratic Forces of the Casamance), which was a rebel group in Senegal.
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Issues (or incompatibilities)
In analyzing the issues involved in the armed conflicts, we find that, in each case, the real issue had to do with intense power struggles between individuals or groups. This was actually the main issue, despite the fact that the conflicts occurred in the context of the transition to democracy and following an election.
In the case of Algeria, facing the prospect of an electoral victory of the FIS, the military officers feared that they would lose the power and prestige they enjoyed within the current system. Consequently, they staged the military coup and cancelled the second round of the parliamentary elections, in order to prevent the electoral victory of the FIS. Thus, by stopping the democratization process at this juncture, they were actually denying the FIS and the Islamists in general the right to rule the country. 
Triggers (or direct causes)
Concerning the triggers (or direct causes) of the armed conflicts, we find that they were different from one case to another. This indicates that the triggers could be anything, and would not be the most important factors of the conflicts. In other words, it can be argued that, in the context of a transition to democracy, an armed conflict could break out if the following conditions and factors are present: overlapping cleavages, incomplete democratization, mobilization of armed groups, and intense power struggle.
In In the case of the Congo Republic, as mentioned earlier, it was the civil disobedience campaign following a disputed election in 1993 that triggered the armed conflicts between the different groups in the country. As
UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia puts it:
What started out as a massive campaign of civil disobedience soon turned into violence along political and ethnic lines. The three main parties subsequently all created armed militias: MCDDI set up the Ninjas, PCT's the Cobra militia and UPADS, the "Réserve Ministerielle", the "Aubevillois" and the "Zoulous". UPADS' three groups were later consolidated as the Cocoyes. 18 In the case of Guinea-Bissau, it was the attempt to arrest General Mané that directly led to the armed conflict in this country. Thus, UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia argues that:
In June 1998, amidst popular unrest due to the deteriorating economic condition and a political crisis, Viera sent troops to arrest Mané, and fighting erupted. The majority of the population, disillusioned with the politics of Viera, supported Mané and his troops and the armed conflict was soon a fact. 19 Finally, in the case of Côte d"Ivoire, it was the rebellion launched by the Northern soldiers in September 2002 17 "Algeria," in ibid. 18 "Congo," ibid. 19 "Guinea-Bissau," in ibid.
that trigger the civil war in this country. It is true that these soldiers were calling for new elections and fighting for the rights of the marginalized Muslims in the North and the immigrants, but the end result was a long bloody civil war between them and the government.
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Conclusion
Combining the analyses of quantitative and qualitative data on democratization and armed conflicts from Freedom House and UCDP/PRIO, this study finds that, by and large, Africa has been politically stable since the end of the Cold War, and the transitions to democracy have been limited in space and depth. Consequently, Africa has remained largely autocratic since the end of the Cold War, with only nine countries (or 16.6%) classified by Freedom House as "Free" (or liberal democracies) in 2012, along with 21 (or 38.8%) "Not Free" (or autocracies), and 23 (or 42.5%) "Partly Free"(or electoral democracies).
It is true that the number of armed conflicts has increased at the same time. However, given the limitation of the democratization, it can be argued that it was not the major factor that led to the increase of armed conflicts in Post-Cold War Africa. On the contrary, this study finds that the transitions to democracy have been peaceful for the most part, and may have generated fewer armed conflicts than the transitions to autocracy and lack of transition.
Concerning the question of how a process of democratization could lead to an armed conflict, this study finds that, in the context of democratization, an armed conflict could break out, if the following conditions are present: overlapping social cleavages, incomplete democratization, mobilization of armed groups (or militia), and intense power struggles between political leaders or groups. In this context, the trigger of the conflict could be anything: it was the military coup of 1991 in Algeria, the disobedience campaign following a disputed election in 1993 in the Congo Republic, the attempted arrested of a dismissed general in Guinea-Bissau, and the rebellion launched by the Northern soldiers in September 2002 in Cote d"Ivoire.
